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QUASI-CONTRACTS--RECOVERY OF MUNICIPAL PAYMENTS
FOR GOODS OR SERVICES UNDER VOID CONTRACTS
The doctrine is well established by the great weight of authority
in the law of municipal corporations that when a municipality had
no contractual power whatever with reference to the subject matter
of a purported contract for services or goods, it does not become
liable either upon the purported contract for the contract price, or
on principles of quasi-contract for the reasonable value of the goods
or services; and in such a case where the money has been paid, it
may be recovered back. The same doctrine prevails with respect
to contract or quasi-contract recovery where the municipal corporation, though having the power to contract with reference to the subject matter, is prohibited by statute or the common law from contracting in any other than a specified way and the prohibition is
disregardedY
In this case however, where the municipality has paid for the
goods or services, an action will not lie to recover back the money
into the treasury. While the weight of the authorities is likewise
with the latter proposition, they are extremely rare, and the purpose here is to examine these authorities and into the reasons which
have been advanced for what looks like an anomaly; namely, that
there can be no recovery from the municipality on the principle
of quasi-contract for the goods and services, yet when goods or
services have been paid for, the payments cannot be recovered back
into the treasury.
Turning first to the rule denying recovery on principles of quasicontract for goods delivered or services rendered under contracts
which are void because the statutory regulations as to the mode
of contracting have been disregarded, the reasoning of the courts
in denying recovery seems to be that while municipalities are within
the principle of quasi-contract liability that no person shall be unjustly enriched at another's expense, yet that principle should not be
applied in such cases on grounds of "public policy", as quasi-contract
recovery would encourage violation of these statutes and would thus
seriously impair the protection of citizens and the taxpayers from the
unfortunate consequences of an extravagant, unwise, or corrupt municipal administration.
This reasoning is apparent from such authorities as FederalPaving
Corporationv. City of Wauwatosa,2 in which the plaintiff sought re147 Harv. Law Rev. 1143; 32 Col. L. Rev. 1018; Journal Painting Co. v. Racine,

210 Wis. 222, 246 N. W. 425 (1933); Shtilse v. Mayville, 223 Wis. 624; 271
N. W. 643 (1937); Federal Paving Corporation v. Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 658,
286 N. W. 546 (1939) ; Bechthold v. Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 544, 277 N.W. 657,
280 N. W. 320 (1938).
2231 Wis. 655, 286 N. W. 546 (1939).
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covery on quasi-contract for the reasonable value of the paving done
under a contract which was void because there had been a substantial
failure to comply with statutory requirements that contracts should
be let to the lowest bidder. In denying recovery, the court said:
"However harsh the result may appear to be the decisions
are sound in principle if there is to be effective enforcement of
mandatory statutes and avoidance of the circumvention of
statutory prohibitions."
The court, in reaching its decision, quoted with approval from
3
Woodward, Quasi-Contracts:

"If the irregularity is such as to deprive the municipality of
the protection of a safeguard against the extravagance or corruption of its officers . . . recovery should be denied."
The Court also quoted from the Restatement of Restitution:'
"A person otherwise entitled to restitution of a benefit conferred by mistake is disentitled thereto if restitution would
seriously impair the protection intended to be afforded by
common law or by statute to persons in the position of the
transferee or of the beneficiary, or to other persons."
Turning now to the rule denying recovery back, a statement
thereof is also found in the Federal Paving Corporation case, Justice
Wickhem speaking for the Court as follows:
"When a municipality has received money, goods, or services, and accepted the benefits, and it had power, had it proceeded in the statutory way to acquire the money, goods, and
services and it has paid therefor, an action will not lie to
recover back the money into the city treasury." 5
The foregoing rule was applied in the Wyoming case of Tobin v.
Sundance.6 In this case the plaintiff had contracted with the town
council of the City of Sundance to do a $5,500.00 street repair job.
On completion, one-half of the agreed price would be payable in
cash and the remaining one-half payable in one year. The contract
was performed and the plaintiff received the agreed cash payment,

but the defendant refused to pay the balance due in one year. The
plaintiff brought this action on the contract. The defense raised was
that the contract was void as it was not let to the lowest bidder
after die advertisement as prescribed by statute. The defendant also

counterclaimed as in an action for money had and received for
the amount already paid. Both the petition and counter-claim were
dismissed.
SP. 261, Sec. 161.
4 P. 241, Sec. 62.
5231 Wis. 655, pg. 658.
645 Wyo. 219, 17 Pac. (2d) 666 (1933).
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In affirming the trial court, the appellate court held that a contract let without compliance with a statute requiring contracts for
public improvements to be let to the lowest bidder after due advertisement for bids is void. Neither acceptance of the work done
nor retention and use of the benefits received estops the municipality
from denying liability on the void contract.
As to the counter-claim however, the court held that recovery
could not be had in an action for money had and received in the
absence of a showing that the party seeking to compel repayment is
equitably entitled thereto. Defendant municipality may not recover
the amount paid in the absence of a showing of wilful evasion of
the law, secrecy, haste, fraud, undue influence, or collusion in making
the payments, and that none of the municipal officers were personally
interested in the contract.
In Village of Pillager v. Hewett," it appeared that the village
and the defendant entered into a written contract for the erection
by the latter of a bridge needed by the former. Shortly thereafter,
the village council inspected the bridge and accepted it. The village then paid to the defendant the sum of $500.00 in cash and
delivered to him it's bonds in the sum of $1,300.00, pursuant to the
agreement as made. Subsequently, it refused to pay the balance
of the contract price. The contract was entered into privately and
not upon and after advertisement for bids as the law required.
It also appeared in the case that the contract had been entered
into by the parties in good faith and that the price thereby agreed
to be paid for the bridge was fair and reasonable; the bridge was
a necessary improvement; and the village was wholly justified in
contracting for and constructing it. The action was brought to recover the money paid and the bonds delivered to the defendant on
the ground of illegality in the contract. The court denied recovery.
In affirming the judgment, the appelate court said:
"We have, then, a case where the plaintiff, a municipal
corporation, was authorized by law to enter into a valid contract for the building of a bridge, and in form, did so with the
defendant, but by reason of its failure to comply with the details
required by the statute (Gen. Laws 1885, p. 170c. 145, p. 51),
in letting the contract, it was void. It may be concluded that
the defendant could not have maintained an action on the
contract to recover the contract price for the bridge, although
he had fully performed the contract on his part, for upon
the grounds of sound public policy the doctrine of ultra vires
is applied with greater strictness to municipal than to private
corporations. This, however, is an action in the nature of an
action for money had and received, which is based upon equi798 Minn. 265, 107 N. W. 815 (1906).
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table principles, to recover back the consideration paid by the
plaintiff to the defendant for building a bridge which was accepted by it, and which fully complied with the terms of the
contract . . . The fact that the bridge was afterwards carried
away by a flood is not material, for it was not due to any
fault of the defendant or anyone else. After the acceptance
of the bridge it became public property, which from its nature
could not be restored to the defendant, and, of necessity, the
the plaintiff would retain and enjoy the benefits thereof so
long as it stood. The defendant in good faith received the
money and bonds in payment for the bridge which he had
built for the plaintiff. The consideration for such payment
was full and fair, and, in equity and good conscience, it ought
to have been made by the plaintiff. Such being the case, it
would be most inequitable and unconscionable to compel the
defendant to return the money and bonds paid to him under
the circumstances found by the trial court, and we hold that
the plaintiff cannot maintain this action to recover them."
The case of State ex rel. Hunt v. Fronizer was instituted under
a statute of the State of Ohio which authorized the prosecuting attorney to recover back county funds which had been misapplied
or illegally drawn from the county treasury. It appeared that the
county commissioners had let a contract for the erection of a bridge
to the defendants, which had been fully executed and the money
had been paid them for the bridge. Another state statute positively
forbade the commissioners to enter into any contract unless a certificate was obtained from the county auditor that the money for
the obligation to be incurred was in the treasury to the credit of
the fund or was in process of collection, and any contract made in
violation of this law was by the law declared to be void. No certificate as thus required had been obtained relative to the bridge contract. The Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court of Ohio all concurred in denying a recovery of
the money thus paid; the court of last resort saying:
"And, putting the question presented in terse form, it is
whether or not section 1277, as above given, authorizes the
recovery back of money paid on a county commissioners bridge
contract fully executed, but rendered void by force of section
2834b, because of the lack, through inadvertance, of the county
auditor's certificate as therein required, there being no claim
of unfairness or fraud in the making, or fraud or extortion
in the execution, of such contract for such work, nor any
claim of effort to put the contractor in statu quo by a return
of the bridge or otherwise; the same having been accepted by
the board of commissioners and incorporated as part of the
public highway.
77 Ohio St. 7, 82 N. E. 518 (1907).
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"This court is of the opinion that such recovery is not
authorized. The principle applicable to the situation is the
equitable one that where one has acquired possession of the
property of another through an unauthorized and void contract,
and has paid for the same, there can be no recovery back of
the money paid without putting, or showing readiness to put,
the other party in statu quo, and that rule controls this case
unless such recovery is plainly authorized by the statute. The
rule rests upon that principle of common honesty that imposes
an obligation to do justice upon all persons, natural as well as
artificial, and is recognized in many cases."
In Miller v. City of Des Moines9 suit was brought to restrain the
performance of a printing contract let by the city council and for a
return of considerable sums of money paid under it. The trial court
held the contract properly awarded. This holding was reversed on
review, the appellate court finding that the award of the contract
had been arbitrarily made and not in the exercise of legal discretion,
in considering the comparative merits of the submitted bids, as required by law. The action of the council was accordingly declared
void. Affirming that part of the judgment of the trial court denying a recovery of the sums already paid on the printing contract,
this language was used:
"In any event the work has been done; it has been accepted
by the city; it is of a character which cannot be returned to
the contractors and thus place them in stau quo; it is work
which if not done by this contractor would have to be done
by some other person; the prices charged are not shown to
be unreasonable; the invalidity of the contract is not chargeable to any wrong or omission on the part of the contractor,
but solely to the act of the city through its council. To say
that the party doing such work must receive no remuneration
therefor, and must return the compensation already received,
is to impose all the penalty upon an innocent party for the
profit of the only party chargeable with the wrong. We are
not disposed to so order. Courts of equity often refuse to
enforce a naked legal right when the results would be manifestly unjust or unconscionable."
A case frequently cited on the rule against recovery back is
the Wisconsin case of Frederick v. Douglas County et al,10 where
the suit was brought by taxpayers of the county to restrain the
county and its officers from paying additional sums to one Grace
on a contract for his services as attorney for the county in certain
tax cases and to compel him to refund to the county several thousands
of dollars which had theretofor been paid. The trial court held
9143 Iowa 409, 122 N, W. 226 (1909).

10 96 Wis. 411, 71 N. W. 798 (1897).
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the contract void, enjoined further payments thereon, and ordered
a return of money paid. The legal principle determined there was
that the county board of supervisors had no power or authority to
employ Grace to take charge of the tax cases and bind the county
for the value of such services. The appellate court affirmed that
part of the decree restraining further payments, but in reversing the
part directing a refund, the appellate court said:
"But he who comes into a court of equity must do equity.
Could it, under any view of the circumstances, be said to
be equitable to compel Mr. Grace to pay back the money
which he received for long and valuable labors, rendered honestly and in good faith, the benefit of which the corporation
has received, and concerning which the taxpayers of Superior
were, or ought to have been, fully informed during their entire
progress? Were a court of equity to make this judgment under
the circumstances, we should regard it as having become an
engine of oppression, rather than an instrument of justice."
This case was followed in Ellefson v. Smith,"1 where money was
paid out under a contract for building a reservoir for the city;
such contract having been let by the city officials of Viroqua, Wisconsin, without any advertisement for bids having been made, no
specifications for the work having been provided, and the contractor having furnished no bond as required by the state law. The
suit was one in equity to compel restoration to the city treasurer
of the money thus expended by the city officials and the contractor.
Affirming a judgment dismissing the suit, the Wisconsin court said:
"The case is one where the city has the full benefit of the
improvement necessarily made, the price was fair, and the city
cannot turn over to the defendants the property so built for
the city. A court of equity does not sit to inflict punishment,
but rather to do justice on well-defined principles. We do
not recognize any appeal to conscience in this matter. No
one has been injured in his person or property right."
In Murphy v. Paul,'2 the Wisconsin court again held:
"It seems to be quite well established from our own decisions as well as from decisions in other states and in accordance with principles announced by text book writers that
in a matter in which the municipality has power to act, where
there has been a completed transaction, though irregular and
unlawful, a court of equity will not require restoration of the
money paid unless some loss can be shown to the taxpayers.
Because to do so would be grossly inequitable."
11182 Wis. 398, 196 N. W. 834 (1924).
12192

Wis. 93, 212 N. W. 402 (1927).
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The case of Marinette County v. Schmitt,3 decided in 1946, reaffirmed the rule in Wisconsin. The Supreme Court reversed a
judgment for the county in its action for money had and received
by the defendant for services rendered as court reporter in the
county court. The defendant was paid, pursuant to a special statute,
on a per diem basis of $10.00 per day, while actually engaged as
such reporter. The act further provided that payments were to be
made out of the county treasury upon the certificate of the county
judge. Between 1929 and 1942 the defendant was paid $5,840.00
on 130 certificates, to 67 of which defendant had affixed the judge's
name, the judge signing the other certificates. The evidence showed
that the defendant upon numerous occasions signed various orders,
papers, and certificates in the name of the county judge and this
was the general practice established by the judge, who knew generally thereof and approved the same. The judge did not, however,
authorize the defendant to affix the judge's signature to the certificates in question, nor did he have actual knowledge thereof until an audit was made by the Wisconsin Department of Taxation which
disclosed that the judge's name was written in two different handwritings, that of the judge and that of the defendant. There was
no means of establishing the number of days defendant was actually
engaged as such reporter, the necessary records and note books of
the defendant having been destroyed according to custom. The plaintiff made no charge of fraud or deceit against the defendant, but
sought recovery solely because the statute required the county judge
to make and sign the certificate as a condition precedent to payment.
The Supreme Court felt that because the certificates signed by
the judge, the certificates signed by the defendant, and the judge's
testimony that he had full confidence in the defendant were uncontroverted, the evidence sufficiently showed that the services were
actually performed. The payments having been made for value received, and not being malum prohibition, but merely an irregular
exercise of a statutory power, the court held the action would not
lie io recover the money back. Frederick v. Douglas County, Ellefson v. Smith, and Murphy v. Paul,14 were cited as authority.
Justice Wickhem, joined by Justice Barlow, dissented; 15 their
argument being that in the instant type of case, the municipality, to
recover, must prove that the services were actually not performed,
and the very difficulty of proof called for an exception to the general
doctrine applying to the usual case in which the value received by the
municipality is susceptible to conclusive proof.
's

248 Wis. 308, 21 N. W. 2d. 717 (1946).

14 Footnotes 11, 12, 13 supra.

5 22 l. W. 2d. 151 (Wis., 1946).
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A recent federal case denying recovery back is that of United
States v. Gaodwtin.'6 This was an action by the federal government
to recover $3,425.00 in wages paid the defendant as an employee
of the Home Owner's Loan Corporation between July 1, 1938 and
January 31, 1941. The defendant, although a resident of Nebraska,
was in fact an alien and a citizen of Great Britain during all of the
time in question. The government contended that the payments were
contrary to the Appropriation acts covering this period which prohibited payment of any of the appropriated funds to aliens, were
therefor illegal, and recovery should be had. The court, in denying
recovery, decided that where the government, or an agency thereof,
has the corporate power to make a contract, if the contract, although
invalid and unenforcable, has been executed, and the government
has accepted and holds the benefits of its execution, having paid
therefor, the government may not, while retaining the benefits, recover back the money which it has paid.
The defendant, in making application for employment, had certified that she was a citizen of the United States, and was born in
Iowa. Under an Act of Congress passed in 1941 the payments to
the defendant, even though an alien, might have been validated by
a finding by the proper authority that there was good faith on the
part of the defendant. That there was no such finding did not preclude the defendant's rights, the court clearly so holding in the following language:
"However, the fact that there has been no such finding in
the defendant's favor is not alone conclusive with respect to
whether the government may recover in this action."
The court felt that even though there had been false representations, since the governmental corporation had the power to
employ, the misrepresentations were immaterial in the absence of
a showing that they effected payment for which no corresponding
benefit had been received.
Summarizing briefly, it would appear that the reason for the
anomalous rule denying quasi-contract recovery from municipalities
for goods and services rendered under contracts declared illegal, and
at the same tifne denying recovery to the municipality for payments
made therefor, is that in the first case a strong public policy operates
to prevent recovery in a case otherwise clearly within the principles
of such recovery, while the second case is not within principles of
quasi-contract recovery. There the defendant has not been unjustly
enriched, but has only acquired by the action of the municipality in
paying him what is justly due, and the courts consider that to compel
16 66 F. Supp. 214 (1946).
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him to pay it back would be making the court an "engine of oppression rather than an instrument of justice".""
In other words, the courts seem to have no inclination to make
a public policy which defeats recovery in a case otherwise within
quasi-contract recovery principles the basis of quasi-contract recovery
in another case in which those principles are not otherwise applicable.
It could be reasoned that denial of recovery back of a payment
which has been received under a contract void because of violation
of statutory prohibitions also encourages further violation of such
statutory prohibitions, though more remotely.
Apparently the courts feel that the rule denying recovery for goods
and services fairly rendered on grounds of public policy is harsh,
as it has been laid down with a quite natural disinclination to so rule,
and that the penalizing force of the policy should not be extended,
even to the reverse case.
It would appear that this is sound and that it would be going
to an extreme bordering on oppression to compel repayment except
where there is found fraud, haste, concealment, collusion, or like
bad faith on the part of the lefendant, forming an ordinary basis
of quasi-contract recovery.
JOHN T. BoYLE

17

96 Wis. 411 at 426 (1897).

